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The deliberately convoluted title of this talk was inspired by my 
growing sense, as an administrator at a Lutheran University, 
that we have over the course of the last decade suffered from 
a diminished capacity to talk about the value of the education 
we provide even as we have increased our ability to discuss 
thoughtfully cost, pricing strategies, financial aid matrices, 
disruptive innovation, MOOCs, and a growing list of hot topics 
within the discourse of higher education. I intend my remarks 
as a small corrective to this tendency. However, I do not wish 
to encourage equally alarming tendencies to circle wagons 
around an unsustainable educational model or to hanker after 
a real or imagined Golden Age of Lutheran higher education 
informed by timeless ideals with little or no regard for the 
specific context within which those ideals must have life and 
pertinence. In other words, any compelling articulation of the 
value of Lutheran higher education must be mindful of the 
turbulence of our academic times.
My consideration of the value Lutheran higher education 
will consist of four parts. I will first present a recent analytical 
description of a college education that should provide both 
another dimension to the central problem of the commodi-
fication of higher education, and a direct challenge to the 
value of a Lutheran education, rightly understood. I will then, 
in the next two parts, consider two of the most important 
implications of the Lutheran concept of vocation for higher 
education, its invitation to re-conceptualize the hallowed 
distinction between liberal and professional studies and its 
insistence that we are all called simultaneously to multiple 
vocations. Finally, in a short final section, I will turn to 
certain practices that are central to all institutions of higher 
learning that Lutherans need to re-think and re-formulate 
in order more fully to realize the distinctive character of 
Lutheran higher education informed by the idea of vocation. 
Disaggregation or Disintegration?
About a year ago, Michael Staton, the co-founder and CEO 
of Inigral, a company that offers a variety of technologies to 
enhance educational practices, answered the question, “What 
is College?” as follows: 
College is a packaged bundle of content, services, experiences, 
and signals that result in an education with both inherent 
and transferable value to the learner. The end goal of this 
educational package is to prepare learners for the job market, 
as well as to instill the knowledge, procedures, and values 
that make individuals effective at navigating, succeeding 
within, and adding value to our society. (Staton 4-5)
To construe college as a bundle of contents and services 
rather than as an integral whole comprised of parts is 
to invite the kind of activity described by the title of the 
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address in which Staton’s definition of college appears, 
“Disaggregating the Components of a College Degree.” 
The major aim of Staton’s address was to demonstrate that 
the internet was already providing and would continue to 
provide many of the components of a college degree much 
more effectively and much more cheaply than the on-campus 
experience at the average college. He thus sought to unbundle 
those components from others that could not so easily be 
provided through the internet, inviting colleges to focus on 
the latter while relying on new technologies to provide the 
former. So, for example, content authoring, production, and 
transfer need no longer be left to faculty members, given the 
enormous resources already available free of charge on the 
internet, whereas mentoring and the supervision of metacog-
nitive processes could not so easily be replaced by technology 
and should be left to faculty members. 
Though most of us, including me, will find the vocabulary 
of disaggregation, commodification, and bundling repugnant, 
we should not be too quick to dismiss Staton’s analysis alto-
gether. Indeed, I suspect that most of us have already applied 
his analysis to some degree or another, perhaps without real-
izing it. Faculty members, for example, are constantly engaged 
in improving their pedagogy, so many of them have long since 
used resources available on the internet to supply content or to 
provide out of class exercises to sharpen skills so that class-
room activity can be addressed to collective endeavors to solve 
problems, apply concepts, and consider the content delivered 
on the internet in fresh ways. This is what flipped classrooms 
are all about. In sum, Staton’s analysis can be used as a kind of 
roadmap to help all of us enhance the distinctive education we 
provide through various technologies. 
However, Staton’s message is finally deeply disturbing, and 
it is inimical to the concept of a Lutheran education informed 
by the idea of vocation. He really is recommending disag-
gregation, i.e. farming out completely some of our most vital 
learning activities to service providers outside of our colleges 
and universities. So, for example, he writes that colleges 
should allow their students to “go through their general 
education courses online” (16). At Valparaiso University, this 
recommendation, if taken seriously, would be catastrophic. 
Our Freshman Core course that runs the entire year and 
that is the foundation of our general education program 
introduces students to college life, forms them into small and 
enduring communities of inquiry, cultivates within them 
a number of pre-disciplinary skills, imbues them with the 
ethos of the institution, gives them a common vocabulary 
including an understanding of the Lutheran idea of vocation, 
and provides nine months of common experience during 
their first year for the students in all of our several colleges 
and schools. Would we dare to turn this vital enterprise over 
to one or another of the several external service providers?
Enhancements and economies, hybrid courses, on-line 
offerings as part of a larger integrated curricular program are 
one thing; complete disaggregation of the services, content, 
experiences, and “signals” (to use Staton’s terminology) is 
quite another. Lutheran colleges and universities, in order to 
be faithful to their mission statements and their callings as 
colleges and universities of the church, seek to form as well 
as inform, to shape character as well as to cultivate arts and 
skills, to show forth every day, in the way that community life 
is ordered, that the moral, the social, the intellectual, and the 
spiritual virtues are inextricable and mutually reinforcing. 
Disaggregation, if carried to extremes, becomes disintegra-
tion. A call or summons, whether to an institution or to an 
individual, is addressed to a whole school or person, not 
to some truncated version of the same. In these days and 
times, we must, as part of our effort to articulate the value of 
a Lutheran education, recover and strengthen those impli-
cations of our common vocation that require us to insist 
upon an education that is integral and whole, possessed of a 
distinctive kind of integrity, if you will. 
Practicality of the Liberal Arts 
One such implication involves a reconceptualization of 
the relationship between liberal and professional study as 
warranted by the Lutheran understanding of vocation. Note 
that Stanton stipulated that the first goal of a college should 
be to “prepare learners for the job market.” Though such a 
claim used to dismay defenders of the value of liberal educa-
tion, we have witnessed over the course of the last couple of 
years a decided apparent shift in both the attitude to such 
claims and in the rhetorical strategies used to defend the 
value of liberal learning by its strongest proponents. Friends 
of liberal education have increasingly defended the liberal 
arts on instrumental or utilitarian grounds: “The job market 
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is rapidly changing; therefore, college graduates need to be 
prepared for jobs that have not yet been created. Moreover, 
most people will change jobs three or four times at least 
during the course of their lives. Therefore, students need 
the arts and skills and habits of mind that only the liberal 
arts can cultivate. Students need to learn how to learn, to be 
enabled to be flexibly responsive to the global market, and to 
be secure enough in their own identities and convictions to 
endure the hardships and disappointments they are bound to 
face. So if you want to be practical, get a liberal arts degree. 
Narrowly technical training makes no sense.” 
Although this defense of a liberal education has much to 
recommend it, many of those who advance it do so grudg-
ingly or with a guilty conscience. Guilt stems from the 
conviction that liberal education is diminished whenever 
its proponents stress its instrumental value over and above 
its intrinsic goodness. Knowledge for its own sake! Liberal 
education as an end in itself! To advance the cause of liberal 
education in any other terms than those that these battle cries 
suggest is to debase the currency of the liberal arts, thereby 
contributing to the narrowly practical mentality that has 
led—so the story goes—to the progressive demise of liberal 
education in our times. 
Friends of the liberal arts should not be plagued by 
these doubts and self-recriminations. The history of liberal 
education provides ample warrants for defending it on 
instrumental grounds. Moreover, Lutheran educators who 
are and who should be friends of liberal learning should 
be more suspicious of claims that liberal education is an 
end in itself than of claims that the liberal arts are good 
for the sake of empowering and equipping human beings 
for various kinds of work in the world. Or, to put matters 
more positively, Lutherans should be guiltlessly disposed 
to use instrumental arguments to defend liberal education. 
Both the Lutheran concept of vocation and Luther’s and 
Melanchthon’s own defenses of what we today call liberal 
education demand that we understand, defend, and promote 
liberal learning in terms of its proper uses, not in terms of 
pure self-cultivation.
Bruce Kimball’s Orators and Philosophers: A History of the 
Ideal of Liberal Education still remains, after twenty-five years, 
the most authoritative source on the history of liberal educa-
tion. As the title suggests, Kimball identified two separate, 
sometimes competing, sometimes complementary versions of 
liberal education that began to develop in ancient Greece and 
that continue to the present time. The two arose simultaneously 
in the fifth century BCE. The first, the philosophical tradition 
or the “liberal free” ideal, stemmed from Socratic notions of 
inquiry as a path to individual excellence, of self-examination 
as indispensable to human flourishing, and of contempla-
tion, not action, as the most choice-worthy human activity. 
Contemporary defenses of liberal education that stress critical 
thinking, intellectual virtues, knowledge as an end in itself, the 
importance self-reflection, self-cultivation, and self-knowledge, 
and the never-ending project of disciplining and furnishing 
the mind to enable and secure the full realization of one’s own 
humanity all can trace their lineage to Socrates.
The oratorical tradition stemmed from the rhetorician 
Isocrates and came into full flower three centuries later in the 
work of the Roman philosopher Cicero. Liberal education, as it 
unfolded within this tradition, stressed speech and language, 
the moral virtues, good character, and knowledge for the sake 
of action in the world of public life. Contemporary defenses 
of the liberal arts that stress character formation, the primacy 
of inter-subjectivity over private thought, community, useful-
ness, civic engagement, and public service can trace their 
lineage to Isocrates and Cicero. Those who defend the liberal 
arts by stressing their usefulness for a life of action in the 
world, including professional life, can draw upon this tradition 
without a bad conscience.
Education for Citizenship
As Kimball insists throughout his book, the two traditions 
he identifies were never really present in their “pure” forms; 
rather, they more often represent two intertwined strands 
of a single tradition. When he published his book in 1986, 
however, he believed that the philosophical or liberal free 
strand was definitely in the ascendancy. Over the subse-
quent quarter century, the rhetorical strand has gradually 
overtaken the philosophical strand in the discourse about 
liberal education. Kimball himself came to believe, during 
the course of his work on American pragmatism, that in the 
United States at least, public, pragmatic philosophers, like the 
late Richard Rorty, shifted the discourse of liberal education 
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away from the liberal free tradition and toward the rhetorical 
tradition. Moreover, the largest national association devoted 
to liberal education, the Association of American Colleges 
and Universities, has for about twenty-five years stressed 
“education for democracy” as one of its major programmatic 
emphases. AAC&U has definitely come to understand liberal 
education as education for citizenship above all else.
Such a conception is far from an innovation. Rather, 
as the (then) Archbishop Rowan Williams reminded the 
Oxford University community seven years ago in his 
Commemoration Day Sermon (June, 2004), the medieval 
universities in Europe, the places that supplied the context for 
the Protestant Reformation, arose primarily from the prac-
tical need for lawyers, doctors, and clergymen, especially for 
trained canon lawyers. The Arts faculty was from the begin-
ning a part of a larger educational enterprise devoted to the 
preparation of “public people,” in Williams’s words, people 
who were equipped to go forth into the world enabled to 
distinguish between good arguments and bad ones, to honor 
the importance of reasoned speech, and to contribute to the 
common good through the exercise of their professional 
skills. For example, what later became a mere class marker 
or an avenue to historical and cultural understanding, the 
study of Latin, was initially a very “practical” undertaking. 
Latin was the language in which legal and ecclesiastical busi-
ness was transacted. Thus, those who today scorn language 
courses that “merely” prepare, say, social workers to deal with 
growing Hispanic populations on the grounds that such study 
is not really liberal learning may have forgotten the principal 
rationale for language study in the medieval university.
Lutheran educators today should be defending liberal 
learning in a way that honors this “medieval practicality,” as 
Williams called it, not only because the medieval university 
arose under decidedly Christian auspices but also because 
Lutherans should agree, along with everyone else, that the 
quality of public action and public discourse has been steadily 
declining for years. Almighty God gave to human beings the 
gift of reason, which, when disciplined through the arts of the 
trivium (we today would call these arts and skills of critical 
thinking, interpretation, and clear expression in writing and in 
speech), equip men and women not only to read the Scriptures 
(which was the principal reason why the Reformers defended a 
liberal arts education) but also to elevate the level and the tone 
of public life. Historians of higher education in the United States 
will someday ponder the question of which came first: the aban-
donment by some English departments (to name only one field 
of study that should cultivate the arts of the trivium) of careful 
attention to close reading, careful writing, and good argument 
for the sake of the study of critical theory and the pursuit of 
fashionable publication, or the decline of liberal arts majors. 
Surely the two developments, widely reported and increasingly 
lamented, are deeply connected. Defending in a persuasive way, 
in word and deed, the liberal arts as “practical” skills should be 
one primary strategy for reviving them in our time.
Life of the Mind as Religion
Should nothing be said to elevate in the public mind the 
“liberal free” ideal, the idea of a liberal education for its own 
sake? Is it not a good thing to invite men and women to 
examine fundamental questions through the study of great 
texts in order that they might become more fully human? Is 
it not good to strengthen and furnish the mind through the 
practice of the liberal arts? Is the capacity to think critically 
not a noble end in itself? Perhaps the most eloquent defense 
of the idea of liberal education as its own end was mounted by 
Cardinal Newman in his The Idea of a University. No book on 
higher education has been in our own time so widely revered 
in theory and so little honored in practice. Though Newman 
recognized very well that a liberal education would inevitably 
have all sorts of practical results, he refused to defend it 
on those grounds. Rather, he insisted that general knowl-
edge (what we would today understand as a combination of 
general education and liberal education) disciplined the mind 
through the cultivation of intellectual virtues like sound 
and balanced judgment, careful reasoning, and synthetic 
comprehension. To be able to bring to bear upon any subject 
the several perspectives of the academic disciplines in a 
thorough, careful, and fair-minded way for the sake of 
understanding the subject both steadily and in all its various 
dimensions—this was the ideal of a general, liberal education. 
It was, and it remains, an exalted and even a compelling ideal, 
since Newman insisted, unlike most of today’s educators, 
that theology had to be a part of the circle of learning (the 
encyclo-paedeia) that constituted general knowledge. Properly 
circumscribed and qualified, Newman’s idea of liberal educa-
tion remains as worthy of defense by Christians today as it 
was in the nineteenth century. And needless to say, the ideal 
propounded by Newman depended upon a face-to-face colle-
gial life, a context that would be difficult to disaggregate.
“Lutheran educators today should 
be defending liberal learning in 
a way that honors this ‘medieval 
practicality.’”
21
The qualifications and circumscriptions are critically 
important, especially if the liberal arts are being defended 
within the precincts of a church-related academy. Newman 
distinguished the intellectual virtues of a liberal education 
very sharply from moral virtues on the one hand and from 
saintliness on the other. No amount of general knowledge 
and no amount of liberal learning could by themselves 
make a man morally virtuous. Newman famously writes, 
“Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel 
with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and 
delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason 
to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of 
man” (121). It was the Church, not the university, that made 
saints, Newman insisted. The university at its very best, 
through the practice of liberal education, could only produce, 
in the language of Newman’s time, the gentleman. Thus, for 
example, the university may induce modesty, an intellectual 
virtue associated with the recognition of the limits of one’s 
own knowledge, but only the church could form the spiritual 
virtue of humility based on the understanding that all of the 
knowledge in the world counts for naught when one stands 
alone before the judgment seat of God. 
Absent the strictures that Newman placed around his 
own ideal of liberal education, the “liberal free” tradition 
has become in some places, over the course of the last two 
centuries, a rough equivalent of the “religion” of the secular 
academy. As Jim Turner has shown, in his book The Liberal 
Education of Charles Eliot Norton and in several articles, at 
the same time that the research university was marginalizing 
Christianity from the formative role it had played in the ante-
bellum colleges, the liberal arts and various fields of study 
(especially the humanities) came to replace Christianity as 
the source of intellectual synthesis, aesthetic cultivation, and 
moral formation within the academy in the United States. 
Within this broader context, Norton’s “invention of Western 
Civilization” (both the course and the concept) was but one of 
the most durable and successful efforts to shape the souls and 
moral sentiments of students in a manner that had once fallen 
within the province of religion. For the secular academy, this 
development may well be regarded, even by Christians, as 
salutary. But within the church-related university, unqualified 
defense of the “liberal free” ideal is problematic.
The replacement of Christianity by some version of the 
“liberal free” ideal within the secular academy may simply 
have been the inevitable result of a deep conflict between them. 
Leon Kass, considering the different ways in which “Athens 
and Jerusalem” have understood and pursued wisdom, has 
argued that the “liberal free” ideal may finally be incompatible 
with the Judeo-Christian tradition. Three years ago, during a 
conversation with me about liberal education, he spoke of the 
incompatibility between Athens and Jerusalem. He argued 
basically this: “If you rightly distinguish two points of depar-
ture: wonder seeking its replacement by knowledge, which 
makes the perplexities go away, on the side of Athens, versus, 
on the side of Jerusalem, the fear or reverence for the Lord, 
which is only the beginning of wisdom but which is never 
superseded by a kind of full understanding or by comfort in 
the sufficiency of one’s own powers. The spirit of these two 
points of departure is very different. Moreover, the wisdom 
of Jerusalem makes extraordinary demands on how you are 
to live. What begins with the fear and reverence for the Lord 
soon issues in a long list of commandments about how to live 
your life. By contrast, the pursuit of wisdom in the manner of 
Plato and Aristotle, following the model of Socrates, produces 
no obligation to family or community, and it seems that the 
highest kind of life is a private life of self-fulfillment through 
the pursuit of wisdom and reflection.”
Lutherans and the Liberal Arts
For Lutherans, then, the defense of liberal education in our 
time represents a vitally important but extremely complicated 
project. The liberal arts, justified in rhetorical terms, are quite 
compatible with Christianity, since their exercise belongs 
to the social and political realms in a way that provides for 
human flourishing. Christians can readily join with their 
secular counterparts in extolling the virtues of the contempo-
rary counterpart of the trivium in promoting a spirit of public 
service and in forming “public people” who practice reasoned 
speech, careful argument, and honest and civil engagement 
with fellow citizens in word and deed. The motives for such 
advocacy may differ, but there is no disagreement over ends. 
As the great monastic Bernard of Clairvaux said in the 
century preceding the formation of the medieval university, 
“Some seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge. That is 
curiosity. Others seek knowledge that they may themselves 
be known. That is vanity. But there are still others who seek 
knowledge in order to serve and edify others, and that is 
charity.” Most Christian and many secular educators today 
would agree with Bernard.
The more “philosophical” tradition of liberal education, 
the one that promotes critical thinking and self-examination 
as practices leading to a life of private self-fulfillment and 
self-sufficiency, can be advocated by educators within church-
related academies only if, like Newman, they stress both the 
powers and the limitations of this ideal. I myself would argue 
that the philosophical tradition of liberal education can only 
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become most fully itself, purged of its own inherent tendencies 
toward a proud and self-sufficient intellectualism that mistakes 
corrosive skepticism for logical rigor, in constructive engage-
ment with religious traditions like Christianity. It may well 
be that within the secular academy, the philosophical ideal of 
liberal education is the very best that can be offered as both a 
source and a bearer of wisdom and moral formation, and the 
durability of that ideal offers grounds for recommending it. 
Even so, the contemporary disenchantment with the liberal 
arts may be connected in part to the increasingly unappealing 
character of the good life for humankind as envisioned by the 
“liberal free” ideal of Athens.
Lutheran colleges and universities at their best attempt to 
maintain a creative tension between Athens and Jerusalem—
and we might add today Benares and Shanghai and many other 
centers of learning around the globe. The Lutheran idea of 
vocation rightly understood must involve both serious atten-
tion to matters of identity and self-knowledge and to matters of 
faithful action in the world, in other words to a seamless inte-
gration of the liberal and the professional, the theoretical and 
the practical. Rightly articulated and developed, the Lutheran 
idea of vocation simply dissolves these distinctions and sets 
before the higher education community a set of practices that 
have their meaning, their sense, and their purpose only within 
a transcendent horizon and only in response to a summons 
from outside of the self. Liberal education cannot fully be itself 
unless it is pursued within a religious context.
A Certain Kind of Character
The Lutheran idea of vocation rightly understood and lived 
out can enhance the value of liberal learning, but it can also 
enhance and justify the value of the entire Lutheran college 
experience. I use the qualifier “rightly understood” advis-
edly here, since two of the many good fruits borne by the 
whole Lilly Endowment funded Project on the Theological 
Exploration of Vocation (PTEV) have been an extension into 
the public realm of the provenance of the term vocation and 
the recovery of the contested character of the concept of voca-
tion within the Christian tradition. I want to acknowledge 
the dynamic character of the concept here, but this is not 
the place to review and analyze all of the various interpreta-
tions of the term. Instead, I want to consider one indisputably 
Lutheran construal of the concept of vocation, namely that we 
are called simultaneously to several tasks, i.e. we are multiply 
stationed in the world as sons and daughters, citizens, educa-
tors, partners, and sometimes parents. 
Though this teaching is well known among Lutherans, 
our colleges and universities have been slow fully to develop 
the implications of the teaching for Lutheran higher educa-
tion. Perhaps the public fixation over the course of the last 
decade on efforts to lead so-called “balanced lives” will impel 
Lutheran educators to realize that preparing young men 
and women for vocations in the world requires nothing less 
than a re-description of human excellence that is grounded 
in the idea of vocation. Such an understanding in turn will 
require the development of a new moral vocabulary, a way of 
speaking about what kind of lives are worthy of regard, admi-
ration, and imitation. It will require as well self-conscious and 
self-critical reflection upon how all of the integral practices 
peculiar to Lutheran college life can be directed toward the 
cultivation of this excellence. 
Lutheran educators have for many years recognized and 
valued the kind of excellence I have in mind here, and they 
have even spent hundreds of thousands of dollars documenting 
the success of Lutheran colleges and universities in cultivating 
this excellence within the souls of their students. Several years 
ago, the Lutheran Educational Conference of North America 
(LECNA) commissioned a research organization, Hardwick/
Day, to do a sociological study that compared Lutheran gradu-
ates of Lutheran colleges with Lutheran graduates of flagship 
state universities and secular liberal arts colleges. The graduates 
of Lutheran colleges and universities consistently performed 
more admirably than both comparative groups in multiple 
domains of human endeavor. They voted more often, volun-
teered more often, read the daily newspaper more often, stayed 
faithful to their partners more often, attended church more 
often, and enjoyed their work more often. In other words, they 
lived out their several concurrent vocations with great distinc-
tion: they displayed a Lutheran form of human excellence. 
So far as I know, the publications that reported and 
interpreted the results of this study made no effort systemati-
cally to link sociology and theology, to connect social facts 
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to theological ideas. I would nevertheless argue today that 
a primary value of a Lutheran education is its capacity to 
cultivate this peculiar kind of excellence, integrally connected 
to the Lutheran idea of vocation but as yet only vaguely 
described. As I have already suggested, the excellence is hard 
to comprehend because we lack the vocabulary for doing so. I 
know this from firsthand experience.
Placing Lives Well Lived
About ten years ago, I tried to pay proper tribute to a 
Valparaiso University colleague who had died, a man named 
John Strietelmeier. I realized, as I tried somehow to capture 
John in words, that I did not have an adequate vocabulary to 
do so. I had to create a new term of art that I still do not much 
like, “local genius,” in my efforts to take the true measure of 
the man and to extol his virtues for the community. I was 
forced to invent this term of art because I discovered that 
established categories of honor just did not fit John. So I did 
the best I could to improvise both a tape measure of ethical 
assessment and a lexicon of virtue by developing a typology 
of human excellence that included the idea of the “local 
genius,” which I have now come to think of as an expression 
of living well in multiple stations within a local community. 
Or, to put it differently, local genius summarizes a conception 
of human excellence as the unfolding transaction between a 
place and a person.
Aristotle famously remarked that in seeking to live nobly 
there are many ways to go wrong but only one way to go right. 
And he might have added that the same thing holds true for 
assessing goodness and nobility in others. Once we have the 
right tape measure, once we have prepared ourselves rightly to 
take the measure of our fellow citizens, we can still go wrong—
as I discovered in the case of John—unless we distinguish 
sharply among the following four types that are often confused: 
the genius, the local genius, the local hero, and the great-souled 
human being. There are family resemblances among these four 
kinds of people, but they are finally quite distinct. 
Geniuses are those who are both possessed of extraordinary 
mental endowments and who use those gifts to create great 
works of human intelligence and imagination—Jane Austen 
in literature, Einstein in science, Georgia O’Keefe in art. Local 
geniuses are also extraordinarily gifted. But whereas geniuses 
are recognized as such exclusively on the basis of the products 
they create, regardless of the ethical quality of the lives that 
they lead, local geniuses are recognized as such primarily on 
the basis of the overall ethical quality of the lives that they 
lead. The excellence of geniuses does not depend at all on their 
local communities. On the contrary, many geniuses are not 
recognized as such by their contemporaries anywhere. Genius 
is in some ways to person what utopia is to place. Geniuses 
arise from somewhere, but their works must finally pass muster 
everywhere. Local geniuses, by contrast, are defined by the 
intersection of their lives with their locations.
This latter fact distinguishes local geniuses from great-
souled men and women who share with local geniuses 
excellence of character but who, like geniuses, do not finally 
belong to a particular place. Indeed, Aristotle had some doubt 
about whether those rare human beings who had achieved 
the full complement of moral and intellectual virtue had any 
need of other human beings. Great-souled human beings 
approach self-sufficiency; local geniuses are most definitely 
not self-sufficient, since their excellence is continuously 
shaped in vital ways by their communities. All local geniuses 
are fine and noble human beings, but not all fine and noble 
human beings are local geniuses.
Nor are local geniuses, local heroes, or heroines. One 
splendid moment of often self-sacrificial and always coura-
geous achievement defines the local hero or heroine. Entire 
companies of 9/11 firefighters were local heroes, but only 
some of them were noble human beings. Local heroism has 
nothing to do with the overall tenor of a life. Like geniuses, 
local heroes and heroines are known for what they do or 
produce, not for who they are. Local geniuses are at least in 
one respect like local heroes or heroines in that they must 
along the way do some things that are truly exceptional.
Example of a Local Genius
Local geniuses, in other words, are not “representative” 
people. John Strietelmeier was anything but a “representa-
tive” or typical citizen of Valparaiso, Indiana. In the words 
of one of his eulogists, one could have seen in John “what a 
nineteenth century English gentleman might look like if he 
happened to tumble into the more disheveled and thread-bare 
twentieth century. John’s gentlemanly traits were a becoming 
modesty, an instinctive traditionalism, a certain reticence 
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of feeling, a capacious mind, a fundamental sense of fair 
play, a robust churchmanship, a firm loyalty to friends and 
colleagues…charity and respect for the lesser fortunate, and a 
generous love for all things human.” 
John Strietelmeier fit himself to the contours of the many 
communities in Valparaiso; his standing as a local genius in 
the whole, comprehensive community was his own doing. 
This work of local genius included John’s patient, uncom-
plaining care over many years for his invalid and increasingly 
demented wife. It included as well his joint authorship, 
credentialed with only a master’s degree, of an influential 
geography text, his twenty-year editorship of a journal 
of literature, the arts, and public affairs, his service as an 
academic vice president, and his authorship of the centennial 
history of Valparaiso University.
But these achievements are mere items in an obituary 
listing. John’s real life genius was a matter of the manner in 
which these several accomplishments and many others besides 
were undertaken, woven together, and offered up in service to 
his community. This involved thousands of decisions about 
when to yield to the call of duty, when to sacrifice personal 
ambition and when to pursue it, when to speak and when to keep 
silent, when to prefer parody and comedy to plain speaking. 
This pliable resourcefulness, this almost unfailing ability to 
know when to scold and when to bless, when to conform and 
when to dissent, this capacity to shape a life in seamless devo-
tion to the tasks immediately to hand—this was a life’s work. 
The measure of that life cannot be a brittle yardstick of 
absolute standards but instead a flexible tape measure that 
follows carefully all of the contours of that peculiar piece 
of the Valparaiso puzzle that John Strietelmeier was for so 
many years. John was a great character whose genius was 
constituted by his context, a man who excelled where he 
found himself stationed in life. His excellence was the direct 
result of his own construal of his life as the response to a 
summons from Almighty God.
I am guessing that everyone knows people like John 
Strietelmeier. I am guessing that many of them are graduates 
to your colleges and universities. And if the LECNA study 
is to be credited, I am guessing further that the people you 
know who remind you of John have attained a level of excel-
lence that you admire in part because they are graduates of 
the schools you represent. What then is the “value added” to 
an education at a Lutheran college? It is the formation of a 
certain kind of character that can be understood, assessed, 
and celebrated only under the aspect of vocation.
Adding Value Added
I must begin this concluding section by complicating what I 
have already said. For we do not, after all, respond to our call-
ings alone; we do so in community with others. Thus, we can 
speak intelligibly about the vocation of a Lutheran college, 
understanding that all members of such academic communi-
ties have different roles to play. John Strietelmeier did not live 
out his vocation in isolation from others. On the contrary, his 
flexible responsiveness to the needs of others and his depen-
dence upon the work and the gifts of others were parts of 
what defined his character.
But do we really want to claim then that John exemplified 
the only kind of excellence that all Lutheran college students 
should emulate and that the colleges should seek to reward 
and celebrate? Yes and no. Yes, because a life like John’s does 
capture that special quality of Lutheran college graduates 
that we easily recognize but often fail to try to articulate. No, 
because it would be absurd not to recognize and celebrate our 
Pulitzer Prize winners, outstanding athletes, and inventive 
entrepreneurs on the grounds that such people often fall short 
of the mark as spouses or children or citizens or volunteers. 
Real genius often shows itself as part of a team effort. Within 
a marriage, for example, we might well witness over time 
one partner devoting herself to the achievement of excel-
lence in a particularly demanding field like medicine while 
the other partner nobly carries forward familial and civic 
responsibilities. What we should say here is that the Lutheran 
college enlarges our conceptions of human excellence just as it 
enlarges the scope of academic freedom by inviting us to attend 
to ultimate questions and to matters of faith as well as reason.
With this qualification in mind, let me invite us to 
consider how we might revise or strengthen our present 
practices with our academies to make more obvious and more 
compelling the added value we evoke and provide as colleges 
and universities of the church. One collection of practices 
that we should review in light of what I have suggested 
about human excellence are our memorial services, eulo-
gies, honorary degree conferrals, alumni recognitions, and 
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all of the other practices we have established in order to set 
before the community embodiments of what we collectively 
regard as praiseworthy. Do we, as part of these practices, seek 
to articulate the special form of human excellence that we 
should and that we do foster? Or are our choices for awards 
and other forms of recognition pretty much the same as they 
would be anywhere?
In view of what I have just said about living out vocation 
in community with others, we should also wonder how we 
organize our work. For example, are academic departments 
simply collections of independent contractors that depend 
upon the department chair to provide all of the advising, 
student recruiting, course scheduling, etc. that are essential 
to education? Do we dare think of the task of providing a 
good science education as a collective endeavor, encouraging 
some faculty to provide advising, others to take responsibility 
for continued pedagogical innovation for the whole depart-
ment, others to shoulder the burden of collegiate governance, 
and still others to focus upon research? Or do we prefer to ask 
each faculty member to take his or her turn regardless of the 
diversity of gifts and inclinations among them?
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Artist Statement for The Journey, by Peter Xiao 
Almost always germinated somewhere between observation 
and imagination, my work began, three decades ago, in 
quasi-narrative and came to focus on picture-making itself. 
The Journey came at middle age to dwell on my personal past 
and present, and on future generation. Circling up above are 
probable callings in my kids—sports, medicine, art, poetry 
(plus a clown vaguely reminiscent of their grandfather Xiao 
Qian, writer and journalist)—beneath which are schemes 
of my youthful pictures. This painting launched my current 
reflecting on my own life experiences starting with the years 
of growing up in China. 
I was a native of Beijing, China, and turned 10 during Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution. When President Nixon helped reopen my 
homeland to the world, I was fooling around with snakes and 
wildlife on a labor farm where my parents, with hundreds  
of other condemned writers and intellectuals belonging under 
the Ministry of Culture, toiled in the rice paddies. After 
two years on my own on the people’s commune after high 
school, I entered Beijing Normal University to study English 
and later came to Iowa to complete a B.A. in fine arts and 
English. Following that, I received a Masters of Fine Arts from 
Tyler School of Art, Temple University, was employed by the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art, and then began teaching part-
time and exhibiting my work in Philadelphia and New York. 
In 1989, I joined the Art Department at Augustana College, 
Rock Island, Illinois, where I am now professor of painting 
and drawing and co-chair of the Asian Studies Program. My 
contact information is Peterxiao@augustana.edu and by office 
phone: (309) 794-7172. 
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